Do People Obey the Law?

FREDERICK SCHAUER*

It is customary in a symposium honoring a book1 as valuable as
Laurence Claus’s for the commentators to begin by noting their general
agreement with the author’s thesis and then explaining that, in the spirit
of academic engagement, they will focus on one small but interesting
area in which the author and the commentator disagree. On this
occasion, however, it seems more appropriate to reverse that approach. For
reasons I will make clear, I am in substantial disagreement with Claus’s
normative argument against authority. Unlike Claus, I believe that “because
I said so” is often, especially when backed by the threat of sanctions, a
necessary and desirable way to organize human existence in a world rife
with sincere (and sometimes insincere) disagreement about many moral
and policy questions and even more ridden with well-meaning
decisionmakers who are often unable to recognize the deficiencies in
their own decisionmaking capacities.2
Yet although Claus embraces a sympathy with the rejection of legal
and political authority that I do not share, he incorporates within his
normative argument against authority a descriptive claim of pervasive
importance—the claim that, as a descriptive matter, people have less respect
*
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1. LAURENCE CLAUS, LAW’S EVOLUTION AND HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (2012).
2. Compare id. at 24, with FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE
128–34 (1991) [hereinafter SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES], and Frederick Schauer,
Imposing Rules, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 85, 88–90 (2005) [hereinafter Schauer, Imposing
Rules].
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for authority and are less inclined to obey authority than much of the
conventional wisdom supposes.3 In this Claus seems largely correct, and
highlighting the soundness of this claim seems far more important than
disputing, once again, the normative claim that Claus believes, mistakenly
in my view, follows from his descriptive one.4
I. TYLER’S MISTAKE
Claus’s basic descriptive claim is that people do not typically, or even
very often, set aside their own best moral judgment just because some
authority directs them to do something different from what their own
deliberations have indicated.5 Here, Claus’s foil, or target, is the highly
influential work of the social psychologist Tom Tyler. In a book entitled
Why People Obey the Law, and in many other writings, Tyler and his
colleagues draw on their survey-based research to support their
conclusion that people often obey legal authorities, even legal authorities
with whom they disagree, when they perceive those authorities to be
acting legitimately—when the authorities operate under conditions of
procedural fairness, engagement with their subjects, and respect for those
who are expected to submit to authority.6
3. See CLAUS, supra note 1, at 65–74.
4. Like others who challenge the virtues of political and legal authority, Claus
views the question of authority’s wisdom largely from the perspective of the subject of
the authority. See, e.g., LESLIE GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE vii (1988) (arguing
that although “political authority is sometimes legitimate,” states often “claim an authority
which cannot in general be justified”); A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL
O BLIGATIONS 57–190 (1979) (rejecting traditional arguments for obedience to
political authority); M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation To Obey the Law?, 82
YALE L.J. 950 (1973) (arguing against the view that there is a moral obligation for subjects to
obey the law just because it is the law). Some of us, however, have argued for some time that
the question of authority may look very different from the perspective of the authority
than it does from the perspective of the subject and that an authority may be justified in
imposing authority even as the subject is justified in resisting it. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER
& EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 4
(2001); SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 2, at 129–34; Larry Alexander, The
Gap, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 697 (1991); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer,
Law’s Limited Domain Confronts Morality’s Universal Empire, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1579, 1587–88 (2007); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1363 (1997); Schauer, Imposing Rules, supra note 2,
at 88–89.
5. See CLAUS, supra note 1, at 65–74.
6. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 3–4 (2006); Tom R. Tyler,
Beyond Self-Interest: Why People Obey Laws and Accept Judicial Decisions, 8 RESPONSIVE
COMMUNITY 44, 50–51 (1998); Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property
Laws: A Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 219, 231 (1997) [hereinafter
Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws]. In the same vein, see also Jonathan
Jackson et al., Why Do People Comply with the Law? Legitimacy and the Influence
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Claus disagrees. Initially, and principally, he supports this disagreement
with an extended discussion of the Illinois use tax, a tax that Illinois
residents are required to pay on out-of-state purchases to compensate for
the fact that such purchases are normally beyond the reach of typically
point-of-sale sales taxes.7 But although Illinois residents are required to
pay such a tax, and although the current version of the Illinois income
tax forms and instructions supports the conclusion that Illinois residents
plainly know that they are required to pay the tax, they typically do not
pay it.8 Indeed, Claus reports that the amount of revenue generated by
the tax, although in theory potentially quite high, in reality is perhaps not
even enough to justify the amount the state spends on the forms and
instructions through which people would pay the tax.9 The rampant
nonpayment of the use tax is thus for Claus strong evidence that Tyler’s
claims about so called voluntary obedience may well be mistaken.
In using this example, Claus makes two nice methodological points.
First, the example draws on roughly the same subject pool—Illinois
residents over the past several decades—that Tyler uses in his book.
This is important because it is highly likely, although perhaps not fully
acknowledged by Claus, that proclivities towards sanction-independent
legal compliance may vary with time, place, and legal culture.10 Thus,
although Californians may perceive a pedestrian stepping onto the street
as a reason to stop, residents of Massachusetts may perceive the same
pedestrian as a target at which to aim. More seriously, we know that rates
of tax compliance vary from country to country,11 and it appears, based
on my own nonsystematic observations, that Finns and Austrians but not
Italians and northeastern urban Americans (and, relevantly in the context
of Claus’s claims, Australians) will stand obediently at a “Don’t Walk”

of Legal Institutions, 52 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1051, 1060 (2012) (arguing that individuals
are more likely to perceive authority as legitimate when the authority implements fair
procedures and is respectful in personal treatment of citizens).
7. See CLAUS, supra note 1, at 66–67.
8. Id. at 67.
9. Id.
10. See Raymond Fisman & Edward Miguel, Corruption, Norms, and Legal
Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1020, 1044
(2007).
11. See James Alm & Benno Torgler, Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the
United States and in Europe, 27 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 224, 243 (2006); Shih-Ying Wu & MeiJane Teng, Determinants of Tax Compliance—A Cross-Country Analysis, 61 FINANZARCHIV
393, 412 (2005).
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sign, even late at night when there is no vehicle in sight and even when
the possibility of apprehension by police for crossing against the sign is
essentially zero. So, although Finns and Austrians, among others, may as
a descriptive matter respect legal authority qua legal authority more than
Claus gives them credit for, his use of roughly the same subject pool as
Tyler gives the example special resonance.
Second, and more importantly, Claus recognizes the asymmetry between
confirmation and disconfirmation.12 That is, he understands that an
example, even an example such as this one that involves numerous cases
of potential obedience or disobedience, but which turned out to confirm
Tyler’s hypothesis, might still tell us little. And that is because if we were
to discover that Illinois residents in fact paid the use tax, we could remain
uncertain about the causes of that outcome. But when we discover that
Illinois residents do not pay the tax, even under conditions of likely
perceived legal legitimacy in the relevant sense, we can have greater
confidence that Tyler’s conclusion is unsound. Because Tyler’s research
would predict use tax compliance under conditions of legal legitimacy in
Tyler’s sense, then even if we observed compliance under conditions of
legal legitimacy we might still be uncertain about the cause. But if we
observed noncompliance under such conditions, as we have if Claus’s
empirical claims are sound, we have better reason to believe that
obedience to law under conditions of legal legitimacy is less strong or
less pervasive than Tyler’s research program appears to conclude.
In questioning the implications of Tyler’s research, Claus alludes to
the major flaw in Tyler’s project; a flaw that deserves more extensive
elaboration.13 Specifically, Tyler appears to divide the world of reasons
into self-interested and law-motivated ones, thus allowing him to conclude
that people who act for reasons of morality have, where those reasons
parallel what the law commands, engaged in “law-related behavior.”14 But
this is a mistake. We know from a great deal of research, much of it
conducted by Tyler’s fellow social psychologists, that people often engage
in moral, altruistic, cooperative, or “prosocial” behavior, frequently at
personal sacrifice without regard to the rewards that such behavior may
bring or the punishment—or other “evil,” to use John Austin’s
characterization15—that refraining from such behavior may incur.16
12. See CLAUS, supra note 1, at 66–67.
13. See id. at 67.
14. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws, supra note 6, at 224
(concluding that “morality [is] the primary factor in shaping law-related behavior”).
15. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 125 (Wilfrid E.
Rumble ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832). Similarly, Jeremy Bentham, whose ideas
provided much of the inspiration for Austin’s work, used the term “evil” in the same way, and
also made reference to “suffering” in describing law’s sanctions. See 9 JEREMY BENTHAM,
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And because this is so, we do not know whether someone who has engaged
in behavior that is consistent with morality and consistent with law has
done so for legal reasons or for moral ones. And without knowing this,
we cannot reach any conclusions about whether the authority of law qua
law has been accepted, which is exactly Claus’s important and entirely
correct point.17
Although the use tax is Claus’s principal example of popular unwillingness
to accept the sanction-independent authority of law, he further supports
his empirical conclusions with the example of marijuana where again,
under circumstances of low enforcement but clear knowledge of what
the law requires, people treat their all-things-except-the-law considered
judgment as superior to the law’s judgment and thus typically ignore the
law when the law and that personal judgment (and personal preferences)

Constitutional Code, in 9 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 113, 192 (John Bowring ed.,
Edinburgh 1843); JEREMY BENTHAM, OF THE LIMITS OF THE PENAL BRANCH OF JURISPRUDENCE
78 (Philip Schofield ed., Clarendon Press, 2010) (1792).
16. See C. Daniel Batson & Laura L. Shaw, Evidence for Altruism: Toward a
Pluralism of Prosocial Motives, 2 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 107, 114 (1991); Augusto Blasi, Moral
Cognition and Moral Action: A Theoretical Perspective, 3 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 178, 205–
06 (1983); Robert Hogan, Moral Conduct and Moral Character: A Psychological Perspective,
79 PSYCHOL. BULL. 217, 230 (1973); John A. King et al., Doing the Right Thing: A Common
Neural Circuit for Appropriate Violent or Compassionate Behavior, 30 NEUROIMAGE 1069,
1073–75 (2006); Louis A. Penner et al., Prosocial Behavior: Multilevel Perspectives, 56 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 365, 385 (2005). Other valuable contributions are collected in 1 MORAL
PSYCHOLOGY: THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY: ADAPTATIONS AND INNATENESS (Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008). There are continuing debates about whether seemingly
altruistic behavior is at some deeper level produced by self-interest, as with the good feelings
that such behavior fosters in the altruist, but these debates are not germane to the issues I
discuss here. See Martin L. Hoffman, Is Empathy Altruistic?, 2 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 131,
131–32 (1991).
17. In describing the non-use-tax-paying behavior of Illinois residents as “moral,”
Claus appears to use the word “moral” to encompass the full range of human practical
judgment and the full range of reasons that people use to reach their judgments about
what to do. See CLAUS, supra note 1, at 67. In this Claus is hardly alone, and a respectable
body of philosophical opinion supports his usage and his understanding of the status of
moral reasons while an equally respectable body of philosophical opinion understands
the realm of the moral in a narrower way, distinguishing the moral from the prudential
and from other inputs into practical reasoning. See ROBERT AUDI, THE ARCHITECTURE OF
REASON: THE STRUCTURE AND SUBSTANCE OF RATIONALITY 162–64 (2001); Douglas W.
Portmore, Position-Relative Consequentialism, Agent-Centered Options, and Supererogation,
113 ETHICS 303 (2003). Although this is not the place to resolve or even take sides in this
philosophical dispute, it is worth noting that describing the prudential, money-saving, and
self-interested decision not to pay a tax under conditions of almost certain nonapprehension
and nonpunishment as “moral” seems counterintuitive and potentially confusing.
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diverge.18 And as a coda to his claim about the empirical nonauthority
of law, Claus asks us also to consider the fact that traditionally Catholic
countries whose religious heritages include strong claims of authority do
not appear to accept authority, of law or of anything else, any more than
have the traditionally Protestant countries whose religious heritages are
far less infused with the very idea of authority.19 Although a tsunami of
variables among countries makes this the least convincing component of
Claus’s claims about the non-existence of authority-accepting behavior,
many other examples that Claus did not use lend considerable support to
his conclusion that sanction-independent deference to law’s claimed
authority—law’s “because I said so” pretensions to use Claus’s apt and
preferred metaphor20—is far more the exception than the rule.21 So,
18. See CLAUS, supra note 1, at 67–68.
19. See id. at 68–70.
20. See id. at 25–37.
21. On previous occasions, I have offered many examples of both citizens and
officials preferring their all-things-other-than-the-law judgments to those of the law
when the two diverge and when the prospect of sanctions is essentially non-existent. See
Frederick Schauer, Ambivalence About the Law, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 11–13 (2007); Frederick
Schauer, The Political Risks (If Any) of Breaking the Law, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 83, 83–
84 (2012); Frederick Schauer, When and How (If at All) Does Law Constrain Official
Action?, 44 GA. L. REV. 769, 770–74 (2010). For experimental research leading to the
same conclusion, see Joshua R. Furgeson et al., Behind the Mask of Method: Political
Orientation and Constitutional Interpretive Preferences, 32 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 502,
509–10 (2008); Joshua R. Furgeson et al., Do a Law’s Policy Implications Affect Beliefs
About Its Constitutionality? An Experimental Test, 32 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 219, 225–26
(2008); N.J. Schweitzer et al., Rule Violations and the Rule of Law: A Factorial Survey
of Public Attitudes, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 615, 633–36 (2007); N.J. Schweitzer et al., Is the
Rule of Law a Law of Rules? Judgments of Rule of Law Violations (CELS 2009 4th
Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1439055. For other examples of widespread noncompliance
under circumstances of low enforcement, see OFFICE OF THE MANHATTAN BOROUGH
PRESIDENT, LED ASTRAY: REFORMING NEW YORK CITY’S ANIMAL CARE AND CONTROL 16
(2013), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/mancb3/downloads/calendar/2013/ACC%20
Reform%20BB%20Reso%201.17.pdf (detailing a ten percent compliance rate for dog
licenses); Ming-yue Kan & Maggie Lau, Tobacco Compliance Check in Hong Kong, 10
NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 337, 339 (2008) (attributing low rate of compliance with youth
tobacco access laws to poor enforcement); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in
Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes,
75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1233 (2000) (discussing that solo freeway commuters often risk
expensive fines by driving in the carpool lane to avoid main freeway traffic congestion);
Rachel Gordon, Parking Fines Nearly Balance Lost Meter Money, S.F. CHRON., May 9,
2007, at B4 (discussing high scofflaw rate for parking meter violations); Joann Loviglio,
Judges Turn to Fines, Jail for Jury Duty Scofflaws, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 11, 2001,
available at 2001 WLNR 11150116 (discussing fines and jail time received for
nonappearance for jury duty); Adam Nagourney, LA Subway Installs First Turnstiles,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 4, 2013, available at 2013 WLNR 10935828 (detailing failure of
public transit honor system); Editorial, Ticketing Hard, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1967, at 46
(advocating strict enforcement and heavy fines to reduce widespread illegal parking habits).

944

Do People Obey the Law?

[VOL. 51: 939, 2014]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

although Socrates, Locke, Rawls, and countless contemporary theorists
have offered various arguments for why the citizen should defer to law’s
moral and practical judgments,22 it is difficult, when faced with the
evidence, to deny that philosophical anarchism may have carried the day
in the courts of public opinion and popular practice, regardless of the
soundness of those arguments as a philosophical matter.23
II. AND MILGRAM’S
It is to Claus’s credit that he acknowledges one of the strongest challenges
to his empirical claim—the conclusion from the famous (or infamous)
Milgram experiments that people are in fact inclined to defer to authority
figures and to do so even when, as in those experiments, the authority
figure urges them to do something they believe profoundly immoral,
such as administering electric shocks to unwilling victims.24
Although Milgram himself encouraged the belief that his experiments
explained the Holocaust and other historical examples of pernicious
obedience to authority, Claus joins the legion of post-Milgram psychologists
who have found in the Milgram experiments a series of dynamics that
have little to do with deference to authority.25 Claus calls upon Max
22. For two particularly valuable surveys of the literature and the history, see generally
William A. Edmundson, State of the Art: The Duty To Obey the Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 215
(2004); George Klosko, The Moral Obligation To Obey the Law, in THE ROUTLEDGE
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 511 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012).
23. See GREEN, supra note 4, at 24–26; SIMMONS, supra note 4, at 194–95; Smith,
supra note 4, at 951; ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 18–19 (1970).
24. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 2–12
(1974); Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL.
371, 376–77 (1963); Stanley Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to
Authority, 18 HUM. REL. 57, 72–75 (1965). Claus’s discussion of Milgram, framed largely in
terms of why people—including Tyler’s survey respondents—claim to obey authority even
though they in fact do not, is in CLAUS, supra note 1, at 70–74.
25. See, e.g., Thomas Blass, Understanding Behavior in the Milgram Obedience
Experiment: The Role of Personality, Situations, and Their Interactions, 60 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 398, 408 (1991); Jerry M. Burger, Replicating Milgram: Would People
Still Obey Today?, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1, 2–4 (2009); Robert B. Cialdini & Noah J.
Goldstein, Social Influence: Compliance and Conformity, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 591,
613–14 (2004); Stephen D. Reicher et al., Working Toward the Experimenter:
Reconceptualizing Obedience Within the Milgram Paradigm As Identification-Based
Followership, 7 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 315, 322–23 (2012); Philip G. Zimbardo,
Comment, On “Obedience to Authority,” 29 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 566, 566 (1974). See
generally ARTHUR G. MILLER, THE OBEDIENCE EXPERIMENTS: A CASE STUDY OF CONTROVERSY
IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1986) (examining the impact of obedience experiments on research).
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Weber in understanding those who followed the instructions to inflict
electric shocks as being influenced not by the status or position of the
instructor but by what Weber called “charismatic authority.”26 In taking
this tack, Claus thus distinguishes following someone’s directions because
of their position from following someone’s instructions because of their
persona.
In the context of the Milgram experiments themselves, the distinction
between role-based authority and charismatic authority may be too fine
to be of much assistance. Indeed, it may be too fine to be overly relevant
to the question of obedience to Hitler, whose charismatic effect on Germans
of the Nazi era is hard to deny.27 But Weber’s distinction, adopted by
Claus, is highly relevant to the question of obedience to law because it
may be that it is the very impersonal nature of law that comes close
to defining legal authority itself. Legal authority, properly understood, is
about deferring to depersonalized norms and a depersonalized system of
rules. Consequently, if as Claus argues with his reference to Weber—
and a large number of psychologists have argued as well28—the lesson
of the Milgram experiments is that people will defer to those in close
proximity to them or that people will cooperate in small group settings,
then it is more difficult to generalize from obedience in the context of
small groups and personal leadership to larger and less personal settings.
Claus’s understanding of the very nature of authority, as John Finnis
points out in his contribution to this symposium,29 is arguably nonstandard
and perhaps misleadingly so. To understand the nature of authority in terms
of the right to be obeyed may load more into the idea of authority than is
useful for understanding its actual operation in various settings. Perhaps, as
Finnis notes, the parent who relies on “because I said so” leaves much to be
desired as a parent,30 and perhaps a parent has no right to engage in this

26. See MAX WEBER, The Nature of Charismatic Authority and Its Routinization,
in ON CHARISMA AND INSTITUTION BUILDING 48 (S.N. Eisenstadt ed., 1968); MAX WEBER,
The Sociology of Charismatic Authority, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 245 (H.H. Gerth & C.
Wright Mills eds. and trans., 2009).
27. For a social, psychological, and historical examination of Hitler’s charismatic
influence during the German Nazi era, see generally LAURENCE REES, HITLER’S CHARISMA:
LEADING MILLIONS INTO THE ABYSS (2012).
28. See, e.g., Stephen Reicher et al., Making a Virtue of Evil: A Five-Step Social
Identity Model of the Development of Collective Hate, 2 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL.
COMPASS 1313, 1334 (2008); Reicher et al., supra note 25, at 317; Sonia Roccas et al.,
The Paradox of Group-Based Guilt: Modes of National Identification, Conflict Vehemence,
and Reactions to the In-Group’s Moral Violations, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
698, 708 (2006).
29. See John Finnis, Freedom, Benefit and Understanding: Reflections on Laurence
Claus’s Critique of Authority, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893 (2014).
30. See id. at 895–96.
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variety of parenting, but such a parent is still largely in control in the
child’s meals, allowance, car keys, and much else.31 And although the
best training of the military officers perhaps will, as Finnis also notes,32
make room for justified disobedience, the sergeant or captain who relies
solely on his power to punish (by court-martial or otherwise) or to withhold
benefits (by leave or promotion) is still someone who uses his coercive
power to require his subjects to take “because I said so” as a sufficient
condition for obedience. It is interesting and important to inquire into
which superiors may justifiably ask their subjects to do what they say
and in which contexts, but for purposes of evaluating the fact and not the
justification of obedience, it may be useful to employ a thinner conception
of authority than the one that Claus adopts.
Still, even a thinner conception of authority, one that distinguishes the
fact of authority from the reasons undergirding it, is substantially supported
by Claus’s examples. Although it is important to evaluate the normative
arguments for and against the acceptance of legal authority, it is also
important for practical and theoretical purposes to understand the actual
terrain of the acceptance of legal authority. Indeed, this importance is
highlighted by the extent to which a number of important theoretical
accounts of law rely on empirical claims about the extent of sanctionindependent legal compliance. Most prominently, H.L.A. Hart used the
image of “the puzzled man”33 to argue that one of the ways in which the
Austinian account failed to “fit the facts”—to use Hart’s language—is in
failing to recognize the existence of puzzled people who have a genuine
desire to comply with the law just because it is the law.34 Similarly, and
even more explicitly, Scott Shapiro emphasizes his assumption that there
are “many” “good citizens” who “accept that the duties imposed by [legal]
rules are separate and independent moral reasons to act.”35 For Hart,
Shapiro, and others, the empirical fact that significant numbers of citizens
follow the law just because it is the law and not because the law happens
to coincide with what they would do for law-independent reasons, even

31. A subject about which, as a childless only child, I feel especially unqualified to
speak.
32. See Finnis, supra note 29, at 896–97.
33. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 40 (3d ed. 2012) (“Why should not law
be equally if not more concerned with the ‘puzzled man’ or ‘ignorant man’ who is willing to
do what is required, if only he can be told what it is?”).
34. Id. at 80.
35. SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 69–70 (2011).
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if in doing so they were in compliance with law, is a substantial reason
to reject Austin’s (and Holmes’s, whose image of the “bad man” was the
individual with which Hart’s “puzzled man” is contrasted36) view that
sanctions, coercion, and force are the centrally important features of law.
By questioning the empirical extent of actual acceptance of legal authority,
and thus in questioning the empirical basis of Hart’s assumption,37 Claus
makes an important contribution. Even though his few examples are best
seen as a skeptical challenge rather than anything approaching a powerful
empirical account in its own right, the skeptical challenge invites those
who too easily accept the empirical fact of law’s content-independent
authority to consider whether citizen and official internalization of law
qua law is as widespread as much of the world of jurisprudence has long
accepted.
III. ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN “IS NOT” AND “OUGHT NOT”
Although Claus’s claim that people do not typically accept law’s
authority when the substance of law’s directives diverges from their
own law-independent and sanction-independent moral judgment is both
right and important, the implications of that claim are rather more debatable.
Although Claus is not entirely clear on the point, he does not appear to
take the fact of nonacceptance of legal authority as itself an argument
against such authority on normative grounds. That is, someone might
argue that ought implies can, that the nonacceptance of legal authority
implies the impossibility of effective legal authority, and that proponents
of legal authority ought to recognize that their prescriptions for legal
authority run into the obstacle of evidence that genuine acceptance of legal
authority appears on the basis of the available evidence to be largely
impossible.
This, however, is not Claus’s argument. He does not move from does
not to cannot to ought not. Rather, he takes the rarities of actual obedience
and actual acceptance of legal authority as further support for his independent
and seemingly conceptual argument that acceptance of legal authority in
Claus’s strong sense of authority is, as a normative matter, an unsound
idea.38 And it is here that, despite my agreement with him on his empirical
claims, he and I part company. That is, although Claus argues that legal
authority is not accepted and that that is a good thing, one might say, and

36. HART, supra note 33, at 40; Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
37. The assumption is also questioned in Michael Plaxton, The Challenge of the
Bad Man, 58 MCGILL L.J. 451 (2012).
38. See CLAUS, supra note 1, at 74–95.
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I would say, that legal authority is not accepted and that often, in some and
maybe many contexts, something ought to be done about that unfortunate
fact.
In order to explain the normative terrain, it is important to understand
that Claus’s examples of nonacceptance of legal authority are all examples
in which sanctions, in the straightforward Austinian sense, are as a
practical matter unavailable.39 Residents of Illinois neither go to prison
nor are fined for failing to pay the use tax.40 The marijuana trade in California
violates federal law, but as Claus notes, federal enforcement in California is
largely nonexistent.41 And I suspect that in most of the instances in which
southern Europeans on Claus’s account are resistant to claims of authority,
such resistance takes place in the context in which punishment, whether
in this life or the next, is not perceived by the authority’s subjects as a
realistic possibility. Indeed, Claus’s account of law as prediction, which
is largely compatible with the Holmesian idea that written law is what
citizens use to predict what the legal system will do to them if they do
not follow the law’s written directives,42 is not necessarily incompatible
with an Austinian sanction-centered account of the nature and operation
of law.43
Leaving prediction aside, however, the fact of nonobedience to law
under conditions of noncoercion leaves two options open. One, which
seems to be Claus’s preference, is to encourage the wise exercise of
authority-independent judgment by law’s subjects. And this, of course,
is exactly the lesson from Claus’s story of U.S. Marine Corporal Dakota
Meyer who was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in 2011 for,
39. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also Matthew H. Kramer, John
Austin on Punishment, in 2 OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 103, 103–04 (Leslie
Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2013).
40. See CLAUS, supra note 1, at 67.
41. See id. at 68.
42. See Holmes, supra note 36, at 458 (describing law as “systematized prediction”).
Claus acknowledges his debt to Holmes in CLAUS, supra note 1, at 4, 6, 190.
43. Claus takes issue with Austin’s focus on a “habit of obedience” but in doing
so makes the idea of a “habit” more important to the Austinian account than Austin would
have accepted. See CLAUS, supra note 1, at 14. For Austin, the habit of obedience explained
the existence of a legal system and illuminated the idea of sovereignty, but nothing in the
Austinian account denies that subjects engaged in a reasoning process in deciding what to
do. See AUSTIN, supra note 15, at 166. Rather, for Austin, as for Bentham, the decision
about what to do, although reasoned, was strongly influenced, but not, as Bentham certainly
fully recognized, exclusively determined, by reasoned considerations of self-interest. See id.
at 104–05.
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on multiple occasions, directly disobeying a direct order on the field of
battle and in doing so saving the lives of thirty-six of his comrades.44
Claus recognizes that had Meyer’s judgment been mistaken, he would
have faced a court-martial. But for Claus, the lesson of the story is that
by relying on “his own eyes and ears on the battlefield,” Meyer properly
recognized that his own eyes and ears on the spot were superior to the
abstractions of the law and even the abstractions of orders given by those
whose vantage points were not as close as Meyer’s.45
It is at this point, however, that we must abstract away from Corporal
Meyer and ask whether the example is generalizable; whether subjects of
authority, who make decisions informed by their own immediate perceptions
of the particular situation, are systematically better able to make decisions
that are superior to those implicit in the generalized and less immediate
decisions of authorities, particularly authorities more distant from the
context in which subjects must decide what to do. For Claus, the answer
is clear: “If Corporal Meyer could manage it, so can we.”46
Well, maybe. We do not know, after all, whether Corporal Meyer could
manage it on multiple occasions. There is no doubt that he was brave,
and there should be no question that he engaged in self-sacrificing heroism.
But maybe he was also lucky. Or maybe he was exceptional. Would the
judgment of even Corporal Meyer himself always turn out so well?47
Would the judgment of all corporals compared to the judgments of all of
their superiors systematically turn out so well? Given what we know about
the fallibility of human judgment in general,48 the fallibility of first-person
judgment and perception,49 and the phenomenon of over-confidence in

44. CLAUS, supra note 1, at 59.
45. Id. at 61.
46. Id. at 91.
47. Some of General Custer’s most noteworthy traits, after all, were great personal
bravery and a reluctance to defer to authority, a reluctance that followed him from West
Point to the Civil War and to Little Big Horn. See STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, CRAZY HORSE
AND CUSTER: THE PARALLEL LIVES OF TWO AMERICAN WARRIORS 99–100, 435–44 (Anchor
Books 1996) (1975).
48. The literature is vast, but a useful start would include DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY
IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (Harper Perennial 2010)
(2008); SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING (1993);
Thomas Gilovich & Dale Griffin, Introduction to HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (photo. reprint
2009) (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
49. Compare Kathy Pezdek, Fallible Eyewitness Memory and Identification, in
CONVICTION OF THE INNOCENT: LESSONS FROM PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 105 (Brian L.
Cutler ed., 2012) (discussing the fallibility of eyewitness memory), and Alison Gopnik,
How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality, 16
BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1, 6 (1993) (arguing that contrary to our adult intuitions, we have
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personal judgment,50 the question is not whether Corporal Meyer was
correct on this occasion. The important questions are whether Corporal
Meyer would be (comparatively) correct on most occasions and whether
the array of all corporals would be (comparatively) correct on most
occasions. When seen in this way, it is hardly clear that the lesson is the
one that Claus would draw from it.
Indeed, we might think of Corporal Meyer’s decision as a decision
made under uncertainty—uncertainty about the outcome of his disobedient
actions. Realistically, few societies are willing to punish the disobedients
whose decisions turn out for the best.51 Ex post, there is little doubt that
Corporal Meyer was going to get his medal, and properly so. Ex ante,
we might want Meyer to do the right thing, but we also want him to take
more seriously than most people do the possibility that his best judgment
might be mistaken. And one way of doing this is to impose serious
punishment for disobedience when the outcome of that disobedience is
unfavorable. Just how serious is not clear; one lesson of the story is that
we would like the Corporal Meyers of the world to be really, really, really
positive in their decisions before they disobey. Under circumstances in
which they are only really positive or only really, really positive, they
should not insist on going with their own judgment.
In casting doubts about the reality of authority and its imposition,
Claus expresses confidence that we, like Corporal Meyer, can “tak[e]
account of everything we have reason to think morally matters when we
decide what to do each day.”52 But if Corporal Meyer can, and we can,
then so too can the sergeant—or lieutenant, captain, major, colonel, or
general—whose orders Meyer disobeyed. Claus appears to assume that
because things worked out for the best, then Meyer’s judgment was better
than the judgment of those whose judgment led them to the belief that
Meyer’s judgment on this occasion might be mistaken. In this case that
was so, but the missing pieces in Claus’s analysis are the possibilities that
no first-person knowledge of intentional states), with Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin, The
Fallibility of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality, 16 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 60, 60 (1993)
(expressing concern with Gopnik’s “questionable assumption that having first-person
experience of a mental state implies infallibility).
50. See generally Siegfried Ludwig Sporer et al., Choosing, Confidence, and Accuracy:
A Meta-Analysis of the Confidence-Accuracy Relation in Eyewitness Identification Studies,
118 PSYCHOL. BULL. 315 (1995) (discussing the weak correlation between eyewitness
identification accuracy and confidence in identification judgments).
51. See ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 4, at 78.
52. CLAUS, supra note 1, at 91.
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authorities as well as subjects can sometimes be trusted to take account
of everything that morally matters and that one of the things that morally
matters is the likelihood that someone else’s judgment about what morally
matters might be mistaken.53
IV. CONCLUSION
Claus wisely illuminates for us an important empirical fact about the
legal world: sanction-independent acceptance of legal authority is not
nearly as widespread as Hart, Shapiro, and many other legal theorists
have assumed. This being so, the normative question is whether this is a
state of affairs to be celebrated and the exercise of independent moral
judgment to be applauded, or whether instead the common disregard of
sanction-independent legal authority, at least in the countries that Claus
and I know best, is a state of affairs to be remedied. And if it is to
be remedied, and if the law is to take account of the fact that considered
individual moral judgment may often be mistaken, then the long-scorned
role of legal coercion needs to be taken more seriously than it is by
Claus, more seriously than it has been taken by Tyler, and more seriously
than it has been taken in much of the post-Hart jurisprudential environment.54
Austin, and to a lesser extent Bentham, were almost surely mistaken in
defining legal obligation in terms of the threat of legal sanctions, but
they, and especially Bentham, may not have been mistaken in recognizing
that the motivations of even morally well-meaning people might need to
be adjusted to account for the possibility of moral mistake.55 Bentham
may have had too dim a view about the possibility of moral wisdom by
ordinary people, but Claus’s view may be too rosy. When seen in this
way, we can understand the often underappreciated role of coercion in
law and understand that Claus’s account of legal authority may rest more
on an empirically contingent view of human moral capabilities than Claus is
willing to acknowledge.

53. See Schauer, Imposing Rules, supra note 2, at 89–90.
54. See Frederick Schauer, Was Austin Right After All? On the Role of Sanctions
in a Theory of Law, 23 RATIO JURIS 1, 18 (2010); see also FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE
OF LAW (forthcoming 2015).
55. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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